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This paper contributes to the literature on the impact of EMU on trade, adding two new 
elements. First, we propose a theoretical model for explaining how the euro could have 
increased trade by the large amounts found in the empirical literature. Second, we propose a 
sectoral dataset to test the insights from the theory. Our theoretical model shows that in a 
monopolistic competition set-up, the effect of exchange rate uncertainty on trade has non-
linear features, suggesting that EMU and a standard measure for exchange rate uncertainty 
should be jointly significant. Our empirical results confirm this finding, with a trade creating 
effect between 108 and 140% in a pooled regression, and between 54 to 88% when sectors 
are estimated individually. Importantly, we find evidence for a trade creating effect also for 
trade with third countries. 
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Non-technical Summary 
This paper contributes to the rapidly growing literature on the impact of Europe’s monetary union on trade 
(hereafter referred to as ‘Rose’ effect), with a theoretical model explaining how the euro could have 
increased trade right from its creation and by the large amounts found in the empirical literature. It proposes, 
for the first time, a theoretical model explaining why the creation of a monetary union can have an effect 
even once the elimination of exchange rate volatility has been taken into account. In the empirical part of 
the paper, we propose a sectorally disaggregated dataset to test the insights from the theory. 
In a monopolistic competition set-up, the effect of exchange rate uncertainty on trade has non linear 
features. We go beyond this finding, as our model predicts a convex relationship between trade volumes and 
exchange rate uncertainty, i.e. the marginal increase in trade as volatility falls gets progressively larger as 
volatility approaches zero. The intuitive explanation for the non-convexity of the trade-volatility link is that 
a reduction in exchange rate volatility raises both the sales per exporting firm and the number of exporting 
firms. This finding is crucial and at the same time new in the literature, as it suggests why the trade-
exchange rate uncertainty relationship can be proxied by a linear volatility term along with a currency union 
dummy. Our model shows that the effect of volatility on trade depends on the marginal costs faced by 
exporting firms. This suggests the use of sectoral data, as the firm structure and hence the cost structure of 
firms tends to widely vary across sectors. 
Our empirical section tests this model on a gravity type trade equation for bilateral trade flows between 12 
countries since 1990. In our specification, we augment the standard gravity specification – with, as 
explanatory variables, size and bilateral distance and fixed effects to reflect time invariant trade resistance 
factors – two measures for exchange rate uncertainty and a dummy for the participation in EMU. A range of 
different specifications allows us to check the sensitivity of the results to the chosen specification for 
exchange rate uncertainty, for the size variable of the gravity equation and for different sectors. A first set of 
estimations pools data across countries and sectors while, in a second instance, data are pooled only across 
countries, allowing thereby for sectoral differences. 
With our two exchange rate uncertainty measures, the variance of the nominal exchange rate return (VOL) 
and the absolute forecast premium (AFP), we test for backward and forward looking expectations, 
respectively. The results for both specifications show that the effect of exchange rate uncertainty is negative, 
significant and robust to changes in the specification. Furthermore, our overall finding of joint significance 
of exchange rate uncertainty and the EMU dummy is in line with the intuition from the theory pointing to 
non-linearities in the relationship between trade and exchange rate uncertainty.  
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The results indicate that the mere creation of EMU would increase trade by 70-112% according to the 
regression pooled both by country and industry, and by 21-108% when allowing for sector specific 
coefficients (taking into account only significant estimates). Although qualitatively similar, estimations 
using the two alternative uncertainty measures are different in size. The EMU effect is smaller when using 
AFP, the forward looking uncertainty measure, as proxy for exchange rate uncertainty. If the AFP is a more 
powerful proxy for exchange rate uncertainty, the bigger figures obtained for the EMU dummy when using 
the backward looking measure (VOL) can be read as reflecting  the part of uncertainty impact that the VOL 
proxy is unable to depict. However, to reach firm conclusions, further investigation on this issue is required.  
The results obtained when adding up the effects of the elimination of exchange rate uncertainty and of the 
creation of a currency union indicate a trade creation effect between 91 and 119%, according to the pooled 
regression and of 40 to 87% when sectors are estimated individually. Furthermore they signal potential 
convexities of the trade volatility link. Introducing higher order uncertainty terms into the pooled regression 
provides further evidence for the convex form of the trade-exchange rate uncertainty relationship.  
It should be noted that the size of the EMU effect is also sensitive to the choice of the size variable (GDP or 
value added by sector). Measurement problems and the limited availability of sectoral value added data are 
possible sources of the observed discrepancies. Differences in results might stem from the fact that when 
dealing with sectoral data, the mapping between empirical and theoretical measures for the size variables of 
the gravity equation (endowment of factors and expenditures) is problematic. Both aggregate GDP and 
sectoral value added are imperfect approximations of real import demand and export supply, which take into 
account cross-sector elasticities. Hence, given the difficulties of precisely assessing the trade creation 
brought about by EMU, we suggest considering the figures provided by our estimations as possible ranges 
of the Rose effect.  
Finally, tests on the impact of EMU on trade flows with non-EMU countries reveal no signs of trade 
diversion. In line with other authors, we find a significant and positive impact in most specifications, 
indicating that third countries tend to trade up to 27% more with EMU countries since the creation of EMU. 
This effect is also stronger for those sectors characterised by increasing returns to scale and imperfect 
competition features.  
1. INTRODUCTION 
Europe’s monetary union provides a unique opportunity to observe the trade effects of exchange rate regime 
changes. Among the many important effects, the trade impact has attracted a great deal of attention from 
policy makers and scholars. Monetary union involves costs and benefits, the most commonly identified cost 
being the loss of monetary policy as a national stabilisation tool, and the most commonly identified benefit 
an increase in trade and investment that monetary union might foster. In short, the ‘cons’ are macro and the 
‘pros’ are micro. For example, the recent debates in the UK and Sweden over potential membership in the 
euro area frequently turn on the euro’s trade impact. At the heart of this discussion is the path-breaking 
empirical study, Rose (2000), which found that currency unions tended to hugely increase bilateral trade 
flows – by about 200% according to some of his estimates. Rose (2000) attracted a multitude of comments 
and critiques – mostly suggesting that Rose’s first estimates were too high. While the general point that 
currency unions have a positive trade effect is now widely accepted, the applicability of Rose’s results to the 
euro area remains difficult. Most of the studies in this literature rely on evidence from currency unions 
between nations that were typically poor and very small economically. 
Fortunately, we now have enough data to directly test for the Rose effect on euro area data. For example, a 
recent paper, Micco et al. (2003), finds a statistically significant increase in euro area aggregate trade right 
from 1999, with their estimates suggesting a gain of between 5% and 20% depending on the sample and the 
statistical technique. This is roughly in line with the findings of other similar studies that include Barr et al 
(2003), Bun and Klaassen (2002), and De Nardis and Vicarelli (2003). 
This paper adds two elements to the rapidly emerging literature on the euro’s trade impact. First, we provide 
a theoretical framework for explaining how the euro could have increased trade. Second, we use  bilateral 
import data for ISIC 2-digit and 3-digit manufacturing sectors for 18 industrialised countries to test for the 
presence of a Rose effect. 
The main finding of this paper is that in a monopolistic competition set-up, the effect of exchange rate 
uncertainty on trade flows is non-linear, indicating that EMU should have some impact on top of the effect 
resulting from setting exchange rate uncertainty equal to zero. Our empirical models confirm this finding, 
both for a pool across countries and sectors, and for a pool only across countries, where we obtain sector 
specific estimates. 
The paper is structured as follows. After the introduction, we review the most relevant literature in Section 2 
and present the theoretical model in Section 3 before turning to the empirics in Sections 4 and 5. The final 
section presents our concluding remarks. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW:  TRADE, EXCHANGE RATE VOLATILITY AND 
CURRENCY UNIONS 
rate volatility, and currency unions. While exchange rate misalignments – persistent departures of real 
exchange rates from their equilibrium values – have been conclusively shown to have a negative link with 
trade (see, inter alia, European Commission, 1995), empirical findings on the volatility-trade link are much 
more mixed. The currency-union-and-trade literature emerged only recently, but here again the empirical 
findings are mixed. Since the results on misalignment are clear and less relevant to our own work, we 
review only the volatility-trade studies in section 2.1 and the currency-union-trade studies in section 2.1.3. 
2.1.  Exchange rate uncertainty 
The trade effect of exchange rate uncertainty has been widely discussed theoretically and empirically at 
least since the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system in the early 1970s.
1 We turn first to the theory. 
2.1.1 Theoretical  literature 
Theoretically, the volatility-trade relationship is ambiguous. The mainstay of the economic logic 
underpinning a negative link is the aversion of firms to engaging in a risky activity, namely trade. This was 
evident in the early post Bretton Woods literature (Clark (1973), Baron (1976a), Hooper and Kohlhagen 
(1978)).  
A second wave of papers, sparked by the dollar’s spectacular rise and fall in the 1980s, sought to account 
for the continual stream of negative results by modifying the assumption of risk aversion. Since standard 
profit-functions are convex in prices, removing risk aversion from firms’ objective function directly led to 
theoretical predictions of an insignificant or even positive relationship between volatility and trade (see De 
Grauwe (1988) and Gros (1987)). A second line of models removed the presumption that exchange rate 
uncertainty would hamper trade risk by showing that hedging possibilities could lead risk averse firms to act 
in ways that made them seem risk neutral (see Ethier (1973) and Baron (1976b), Viaene and de Vries 
(1992)). A third line of papers argued that the inability to find a negative volatility-trade link stemmed from 
the fact that exchange rate risk was small relative to other risks incurred by the exporter (see Grauwe 
(2000), Gros (1987), Broll and Eckwert (1999), Bacchetta and Wincoop (1998)). A very different line of 
models studied the behaviour of risk neutral firms facing a sunk market-entry cost (see Baldwin (1988), 
Baldwin and Krugman (1989), Dixit (1989), Krugman (1989), Franke (1991), Sercu and Vanhulle (1992)). 
                                                      
1 For more extended literature reviews about the effect of exchange rate volatility on trade, see IMF (1984), Côté 
(1994), McKenzie (1999), Skudelny (2002) and Taglioni (2002). 
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The literature distinguishes three types of exchange rate uncertainty: exchange rate misalignment, exchange  
These models introduced the possibility of trade hysteresis and, depending upon modelling details, could 
predict a negative, positive and no effect of exchange rate uncertainty on trade. 
2.1.2 Empirical  literature 
Given the importance of the topic and the ready availability of the necessary data, it is not surprising to find 
a huge number of empirical studies on the volatility-trade link. For analytic purposes, it is useful to classify 
the studies according to the type of data used, namely times series, cross-section, or panel. A summary of all 
the studies is presented in Table 1, Table 2 and Table 3. Here we discuss the general conclusions. 
Most studies employed time series techniques and found no significant relationship between volatility and 
trade. The few that found a link, suggested that the effect was very small (see Koray and Lastrapes (1989), 
Bélanger and Gutierrez (1988), Bini-Smaghi (1991), Kenen and Rodrik (1986) and Sekkat (1998)  
More recently, some studies implemented co-integration analysis, as for example Arize (1997, 1998a and b), 
Fountas and Aristotelous (1999) and Koray and Lastrapes (1989). An empirical review of this strand of 
literature is reported in Flam and Jansson (2000). The results of the studies taking into consideration the 
trend characteristics of the time-series appear to be more clear-cut; most suggest a significant negative effect 
of exchange rate uncertainty on the trade variables. However, at least three studies employing the above-
mentioned techniques, among which the one from Flam and Jansson, report significantly positive or mixed 
results
2. Moreover, the choice between OLS regressions and co-integration analysis depends on the 
stationarity properties of the trade variable and of the proxy for exchange rate uncertainty. 
                                                      
2 Flam and Jansson find that the long run relations between exchange rate volatility and exports are mostly negative 
and in several cases insignificantly different from zero. McKenzie (1998) analyses Australian imports and exports at 
the sectoral level and obtains mixed results. Daly (1998) analyses bilateral trade between Japan and seven other 
industrialised countries, finding significantly positive results for seven import and five export flows out of fourteen.  
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Table 1: Empirical literature using time series techniques 
Authors
1) Period  Region






Time series studies           
Arize (1997)  73-92  G7  Moving average σ [RER]  X  all var I(1) and co-
int 
Arize (1998a)  73-93  US  Moving average σ [RER]  M  all var I(1) and co-
int 
Arize (1998b)  73-95  BL, DK, FI, 
FR, GR, NL, 
SP and SD 
σ [REER] from predicted value 
(fitting 4th order auto-regressive 
process) 
M  all var I(1) and co-
int 
Bailey and Tavlas (1988)  75-86  US  abs [REERR] 
σ [REER] and σ [FEER] 
Aggr. X  n.s. 
Bélanger and Gutierrez (1988)  76-87  CAN-US  squared forcast error  X, 5 sectors  s. neg. in 2 sectors
Bini-Smaghi (1991)  76-84  GE, FR, IT, 
intra EMS 
VEERR X  s.  neg. 
Cushman (1988)  74-83  US  MA σ [RERR] 
E[RER] 
E [FER] 
Bil. X  s./n.s., 
pos./neg. 
Fountas and Aristotelous (1999)  73-96  FR, GE, IT, 
UK 
MA σ [NEERR] 
Dummy ERM 
Bil. X  σ [NEERR] 
mostly s. neg.  
Dummy n.s. 
Gagnon (1993)  60-88  US  based on regression of the RER  Bil. X  n.s. 
Kenen and Rodrik (1986)  75-84  11 indus  σ [RERR] 
different forecast errors 
M s.  neg. 
Klaassen (2000)  78-96  US-G7  MA VNERR  Bil. X  Mostly n.s. 
Koray and Lastrapes (1989)  61-71, 75-
85 
US-UK, GE, 
FR, JP, CAN 
VRERR  Bil. M  s. neg. (small) 
Kumar (1992)  62-88  US, GE, JP  σ (RERR)  Intra-industry 
X+M 
Mixed 
Lastrapes and Koray (1990)  75-87  US  VRERR and VNERR  Aggr. X and M  s. neg. (weak) 
McKenzie (1998)  69-95  AUS  ARCH  ∆X 
∆M 
Mixed results 
McKenzie and Brocks (1997)  73-92  GE-US  ARCH  ∆X 
∆M 
s. pos. 
Perée and Steinherr (1989)  60-85  US, JP, UK, 
GE, BL 
LT uncertainty  Aggr. and bil. X  Aggr n.s., often s. 
neg. in bil equ 
Sekkat (1998)  75-94  FR, IT, GE, 
UK and BL)  
σ [NERR] 
misalignment 
X vol and P 
3SLS, ECM 




1) A star designates authors using gravity type trade models 
2) indus: industrialised countries; WT: world trade (trade from different regions, sample depending on data available). 
3) (V)N(R)E(E)R(R): (variance of the) nominal (real) (effective) exchange rate (return); MA: moving average; σ: standard deviation 
4) M: imports, X: exports, ∆: variable in first difference 
5) (n.)s.: coefficient on the exchange rate uncertainty term is (non-)significantly different from zero at 5%. 
Cross sectional studies were more likely to find a link, but again the effect was in most cases relatively 
small (see Hooper and Kohlhagen (1978), De Grauwe (1987), Brada and Méndez (1988), De Grauwe and 
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Table 2: Empirical literature using cross-section techniques 
Cross-sectional analysis           
Brada and Méndez (1988)*  73-77  WT  dummy ER regime  Bil. X  Effect float pos. 
De Grauwe (1987)  73-84  EU  σ [R(N)ERR]  Bil. X  s. neg. 
De Grauwe and Verfaille (1988)  79-85  15 indus  VRERR  Bil. X  Trade in EMS > 
outside EMS 
Eichengreen and Irwin (1995)*  30s  WT  VNERR  X  s. neg., small 
Frankel and Wei (1993)*  80, 85, 90  WT  σ [N(R)ERR]  Bil. trade  s. neg. in 80, s. 
pos. in 90, small 
Hooper and Kohlhagen (1978)  65-75  6 indus  σ NER 
σ (FER) 
abs[FER(-1)-NER] 
X prices and 
volumes 
P: s. neg. 
Vol: n.s. 
Sapir et al. (1994)  73-92  GE-EC 
GE-non EC 
NERR  Bil. M  s. neg., small 
Savvides (1992)  73-86  WT  σ (REERR)  ∆X  only unanticipated 
RER vol. s. neg.   
         
Wei (1999)*  75, 80, 85, 
90 
63 countries  σ [N(R)ERR] 
Dummy hedging instruments 
Bil. trade  s. neg. 
dummy ns 
1) A star designates authors using gravity type trade   models  
2) indus: industrialised countries; WT: world trade (trade from different regions, sample depending on data available). 
3) (V)N(R)E(E)R(R): (variance of the) nominal (real) (effective) exchange rate (return); MA: moving average; σ: standard deviation 
4) M: imports, X: exports, ∆: variable in first difference 
5) (n.)s.: coefficient on the exchange rate uncertainty term is (non-)significantly different from zero at 5%. 
The reason for this difference in using a cross sectional or a time series analysis relies in the fact that a 
volatility term in a time series analysis may capture the volatility of other variables in the model. The effect 
of the latter might differ from what we expect from exchange rate volatility, so that the total outcome is 
uncertain. The problem of cross sectional studies is that their outcome may be heavily dependent on the 
selected countries. A heterogeneous sample of industrial and less developed countries could lead to an 
estimation bias due to omitted variables driving trade flows in the different countries. The only practical 
solution to these shortcomings was to use fixed-effects estimators on panel data.  
Studies that used panel data and estimation methods find a significant and negative effect of exchange rate 
uncertainty on the volume of trade, with the magnitude of the impact being quite large; reaching levels of 
around 10% in the long run. (See Abrams (1980), Thursby and Thursby (1987), Dell'Ariccia (1998), Pugh et 
al. (1999), Rose (2000), De Grauwe and Skudelny (2000) and Anderton and Skudelny (2001) who all use 
panel data econometrics. 
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Table 3: Empirical literature using panel techniques 
Panel techniques           
Abrams (1980)*  73-76  19 indus  VNER and VNERR  Bil X  s. neg. 
Anderton and Skudelny (2001)  89-99  EMU  VNERR  Bil M  s. neg. 
De Grauwe and Skudelny (2000)  61-95  EU  VNERR  Bil. X  s. neg. 





X+M s.  neg.; 
strong effect (ca 
10-12%) 
Pugh et al. (1999)*  80-92  16 OECD  σ [NERR]  M demand 
growth; X (level) 
s. neg., big; 
bigger for non-
ERM countries 
Rose (2000)*  70, 75, 80, 
85, 90 
WT  MA σ [NERR] 
MA max[abs(NERR)] 
MA 90
th percentile univariate 
distribution of ERR 
MA σ [ER] 
σ [ERR] 
dummy for currency union 
X  vol: s. neg. ; 
CU: s. pos.  
big effect of both 
Thursby and Thursby (1987)*  74-82  17 indus  VNER around predicted trend  Bil. X  s. neg. 
1) A star designates authors using gravity type trade models 
2) indus: industrialised countries; WT: world trade (trade from different regions, sample depending on data available). 
3) (V)N(R)E(E)R(R): (variance of the) nominal (real) (effective) exchange rate (return); MA: moving average; σ: standard deviation 
4) M: imports, X: exports, ∆: variable in first difference 
5) (n.)s.: coefficient on the exchange rate uncertainty term is (non-)significantly different from zero at 5%. 
 
In summary, there seems to be a clear superiority of panel techniques in a situation involving substantial 
cross-nation variation in unobserved variables as well as substantial time-series variation. Therefore, the 
profession has progressively come to downgrade the importance of the slew of non-findings in the early 
literature. The empirical assertion that uncertainty reduces trade in a first-order manner should hence be 
taken seriously. The remaining question is by how much uncertainty reduces trade.  
2.1.3  Currency unions and trade 
An important subset of the empirical works on exchange rates and trade concerns what we call the Rose 
effect. Rose (2000) started the debate by finding that countries participating in a currency union seemed to 
trade three times more than expected – even when one controlled for the impact of exchange rate volatility. 
In his seminal paper, Rose (2000) uses a gravity model of trade flows for a panel over five year intervals 
spanning 1970 to 1990 for 186 countries, dependencies, territories, overseas departments, colonies, etc. On 
top of the standard variables for a gravity model, he introduces a volatility measure and a dummy variable 
for trading partners using the same currency (330 in his sample of 31000 observations in total). Rose (2000) 
finds a significant positive effect for this dummy with a coefficient of 1.21, implying that countries within a 
currency union traded 2.3 times more with the other members of the currency union than with third 
countries. Rose conducts some sensitivity analysis, excluding some countries, changing the measurement of 
12
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monetary regime (the currency union dummy), using alternative measures for distance and adding possible 
omitted variables, and always finds a significant and substantial effect. 
Several studies have built upon this framework and provide support for the thesis of Rose (2000) pointing to 
a very substantial effect of a currency union on trade flows. Rose and van Wincoop (2001) control for the 
effect of multilateral trade resistance. Rose and Engel (2002) construct a gravity model with similar control 
variables as Rose (2000), but use a cross sectional approach, with a sample of 150 countries (or territories, 
etc.) in the year 1995, and do not have, among the explanatory variables, a proxy for exchange rate 
volatility. The study of Glick and Rose (2002) is based on a panel of 217 countries (or territories, etc.) with 
annual observations from 1948 to 1997. The estimation is based on a gravity equation as in Rose (2000), 
excluding however the volatility variable. Moreover, Glick and Rose use the random effects, the fixed 
effects, the between and the maximum likelihood estimators for panel data. Nitsch (2002) makes the 
following main changes to the estimates of Rose (2000), thereby entailing significant changes in the 
coefficient of the currency union dummy: First, he uses cross-sectional estimates over 5 years rather than 
pooling the data across time and country pairings. Second, he corrects the data set which apparently 
contained some misclassifications. It then introduces different language dummies, and separate dummies for 
each currency. Finally, it uses a regression method correcting for the missing observations of Rose’s sample. 
Persson (2001) argues that non-linearity of the relationship might partly explain the surprisingly large 
results for the currency union dummy found by Rose (1999). The reply by Rose (2001) includes a new set of 
consistency checks and suggests that countries participating in currency unions trade 1.1 times more than 
other countries. In his reply, Rose is cautions against the applicability of his finding to the EMU, because 
most countries within currency unions in his sample are “small, poor or both, unlike most of the Euro-11.” 
Honohan (2001) argues that the sample of Rose covers mostly colonial countries. For this sort of countries 
the currency dummy measures rather whether the abolition of a common currency reduces trade, so that no 
inference can be made regarding the effect of the creation of a monetary union, as for example EMU. 
Although the modifications to the original empirical results are quite substantial, the general finding is that 
countries belonging to the same currency union trade substantially more with each other.  
Micco et al. (2003) analyse the impact of a currency union on trade flows for the specific case of EMU. 
They use data for 22 industrial countries including the EMU countries and introduce, on top of the standard 
variables a dummy for membership in EMU. Their estimates suggest a gain of between 5% and 20% 
depending upon the data sample and statistical technique. Barr et al. (2003) estimate a gravity model for 
European countries, including both EMU and non-EMU countries. Their estimates for the period 1978 to 
2002 indicate the currency union effect amounts to 29%. They also control for exchange rate volatility and 
find a trade reduction through exchange rate volatility by 12%.  
13
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Klein and Shambaugh (2004) estimate not only the impact of exchange rate volatility and of a currency 
union dummy, but also include the possibility of fixed exchange rates. They find for a dataset starting in the 
1970s for more than 10.000 country pairings that fixed exchange rate regimes also have a strong effect on 
trade, though a smaller than currency unions. We will however not distinguish between fixed exchange rate 
regimes and currency unions in this paper, as this distinction doesn’t apply to the European case. 
With this review of the literature in hand, we turn to theoretical considerations that should help guide our 
empirical work in Section 4. 
3. THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS 
3.1.  Theorizing about the theory: not only more exports per firm 
A drop in exchange rate volatility can increase the volume of trade in two not mutually exclusive ways – by 
producing more exports per firm, and by increasing the number of firms that are engaged in exporting. 
Given the magnitude of the impact of monetary union on trade volume found in the typical Rose-effect 
study and the rather small size of transaction costs that are eliminated by a currency union, it seem 
impossible that the rise in the exports-per-firm allowed could sufficiently explain the volume response.  
For example, De Grauwe (1994) reports that the buying and selling spreads between the Belgian Franc and 
various industrial country currencies were quite low, approximately 500 basis points. For Europe as a 
whole, Emerson et al (1992) estimated all the costs involved in currency exchanging (this includes the 
salaries of all forex market participants) to be only about 0.5 percent of GDP, with much of this related to 
the massive turnover associated with asset trade rather than goods trade. For smaller, more open member 
countries with less liquid currency markets, they found the cost to be as high as 1% of GDP.  
Taking the high end of these estimates and conservatively approximating the trade to GDP ratio to be 50% 
in Europe, we see that a high-side estimate of transaction cost would be something like 2%. Now consider 
the impact of a monetary union reducing trade cost by 2%. Even if the cost reduction were fully passed on 
to consumers, the aggregate import demand elasticity would have to be unreasonably large to explain the 
20% to 40% rise that has been estimated in the Rose-effect literature on the euro area. Indeed, it is rare to 
find estimated aggregate import demand elasticities that exceed 2.
3 This is especially true since all the 
existing studies use data that pre-dates the currency union (the euro area was only a monetary union up to 
                                                      
3 Since the euro affects all trade, not just a specific product, the relevant elasticity is for aggregate trade. Elasticity 
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2001), so many multi-currency related costs had not yet been eliminated in their sample and thus could not 
be responsible for the trade gain. 
3.1.1  The basic logic of our model 
This pair of observations directs the theory towards a story that turns on the decision of firms to enter the 
foreign market, in other words, towards models in the spirit of the ‘beachhead model’ of Baldwin (1988).
4 
Our basic story is simple. It is a well-known fact that most firms in European economies are small, and that 
the vast majority of them do not export. One factor that keeps them from exporting is the uncertainty 
involved in trade. In our model, a reduction in uncertainty induces more firms to export and this raises the 
trade volume.  
While this accounts for a negative volatility-trade link, it does not address the Rose effect, namely the 
impact of currency union controlling for a linear (or log-linear) volatility-trade link. To get this, we must 
also explain why the volatility-trade link is convex. Figure 1 helps explain the argument. 
Suppose the true relationship between volatility and trade is convex, as illustrated by the solid curve in the 
diagram. An empirical model that assumed a linear link between volatility and trade (as illustrated by the 
dashed line), but also allowed a dummy for monetary union (i.e. zero volatility), would estimate the dummy 
to be positive and significant. Importantly, if the link is sufficiently convex, then adding a finite number of 
higher order volatility term to the regression would not be enough. There would still be room for a 
significant currency dummy.
5  
We focus on two sources of convexity. First, it is often asserted that volatility affects small firms more than 
it affects large ones. Consequently, the marginal impact of lower volatility will be large when the initial set 
of exporting firms includes more small firms (as predicted by the negative level relationship between 
minimum firm size and exporting). Second, the empirical distribution of firms in European nations is 
heavily skewed towards smaller firms. Thus each reduction in the minimum size-class necessary for 
exporting brings forth an ever larger number of new exporters.  
                                                      
4 For empirical support for the beachhead model see, e.g., Tybout and Roberts (1997) 
5 Any continuous function can be perfectly approximated by a polynomial of a sufficiently high order, however, some 
convex functions have an infinite number of non-zero higher-order derivatives, so one would need an infinite 
polynomial to capture the true relationship. 
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Figure 1: Convexity of the volume-volatility link 
We turn now to presenting a very simple model to illustrate the economic logic of a convex link between 
exchange rate volatility and trade volumes.  
3.2.  A stylised model: impact of volatility on trade 
The goal of this model is to provide a concrete example of how a reduction in uncertainty can raise the 
volume of trade in a convex manner by altering the range of firms engaged in exporting.  
3.2.1  Basic set up 
We shall need, at a minimum, two nations (Home and Foreign) and two types of firms. One type sells only 
locally, while the other type sells both locally and abroad. The fulcrum of the analysis will be firms’ market-
entry decision, i.e. a typical firm’s decision to begin exporting when the exchange rate is uncertain. To keep 
the model as simple as possible, we assume that there is a fixed range of Home-based firms in existence and 
then focus on their decisions to entry the Foreign market. In particular, we assume that entering the Foreign 
market, i.e. beginning to export, involves a market-specific sunk cost as in Baldwin (1988). As we shall see, 
the key trade-off facing potential exporters is the uncertain revenue from exporting versus the deterministic 
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3.2.2  Technology, market structure and timing 
Again to keep reasoning as streamlined as possible, we work with a partial equilibrium model, assume 
segmented markets with Cournot conjectures in each market. Since we take the number of Home firms that 
are active in the Home market as given, we can, without further loss of generality, focus only on the 
Foreign-market entry decision, i.e. Home firms’ export decision.  
Each monopolistically competitive Home firm produces a differentiated good and all of these enter the 
foreigners’ preferences symmetrically in the sense that the demand function for each Home variety in the 
Foreign market is identical and equal to: 
(1)  ∫ − − =
'
0 ) ( ) ( ) (
i
di i q b j q a j p  
for all Home varieties i∈{0,…,i’} that are sold in the Foreign market (i’ indicates the upper range of the 
goods sold).  
Firms play Cournot (Nash in quantities) market by market, which, as usual, is tantamount to assuming that 
markets are segmented; in other words, firms can engage in third degree price discrimination. Since each 
variety is distinct, each firm is a monopolist for its variety in each market but it competes indirectly with all 
other varieties as shown by the last term in the demand equation. 
Timing of the exchange rate uncertainty 
Models with uncertainty require assumptions concerning the timing of decisions. We want a situation where 
the market-entry decision is taken with the long run perspective in mind, i.e. where the entry decision is 
taken by firms before the exact future exchange rates are known. Thus, firms use their knowledge of the 
stochastic process generating the exchange rate in order to formulate expectations of the level and volatility 
of profits. Any firm that enters a market then chooses its level of sales, again without knowing the 
realisation of the exchange rate. This is meant to reflect the fact that production and sales decisions are 
taken only occasionally, but the exchange rate fluctuates continuously. At all moments, firms take the 
exchange rate’s stochastic process as given. In particular, changes in the process’s volatility, including a 
shift to a common currency, are unanticipated. 
Firms in our model are risk averse. To focus sharply on the essential logic of the mechanism under study, 
we adopt the simplest form of risk aversion. Namely, we assume that the firm discounts an uncertain stream 
of revenue using a risk premium that is related to the stream’s variance and a risk-aversion parameter. 
Formally, the firm maximizes utility of profits, where the utility function is: 
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(2) 
2 σ − Π = E U  
Here Π is pure profit (this includes operating profit and fixed costs), E is the expectations operator, and σ
2 is 
the variance of the exchange rate.  
3.2.3  Short-run equilibrium conditions 
As usual, we solve the model backward, which in our case, means we solve for prices, quantities and 
operating profits, taking the range of exporting firms as given.  
Exporting firms problems 
Home firms that export face exchange rate risk directly since the level of the exchange rate affects their 
marginal cost of selling to Home. In particular, their operating profit in Foreign currency units is: 
(3)  q sm p i ) ( τ π − ≡   
where p is the price, q is per-firm export, m is the marginal cost, ‘s’ is the spot rate (Foreign currency price 
of Home currency), and τ≥1 is the ad valorem tariff equivalent of trade barriers.  
Although Home firms produce varieties that are symmetric in terms of consumption, they have 
heterogeneous technology, a la Melitz (2003). In particular, firms have different marginal production costs 
and we arrange firms according to decreasing marginal cost, with marginal cost ranging from zero to a 
maximum of m0; these costs are in Home currency units; mi denotes the marginal cost of firms with index i; 
below, we discuss the density of firms along the i range. 
In expected value terms, π is (p-s




2 is the variance of the spot rate ‘s’ (for simplicity, we take σ to be time-invariant). 
The typical exporting firm’s problem is to choose its sales to the Foreign market, q, to maximise: 
(4) 
2 2 ) ( ) ( max q m q m s p V i i
e
q τ σ τ − − =  
For first-order condition implies: 











i di i q Q
m b





To solve for the integral in this expression, we integrate over q(i) for all i, but we find it convenient to 
switch variables of integration from ‘i’ to m. To do this, however, we must weight the qi by the mass of 
firms that have the same marginal cost, m, and are thus selling that amount. Specifically: 
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where n(m) gives the mass of firms with marginal cost ‘m’, and mC is the maximum marginal cost at which 
firms find it worthwhile selling to this market (we identify mC below). 
To get an explicit solution for Q requires an explicit functional form for n(m). For simplicity we assume that 
n(m)=m
2. Note that this reflects the well-known fact that the size distribution of firms is skewed heavily 
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where we have taken s
e=1 to reduce clutter in the expression. 
Expected operating profit 
As is well known, operating profit is the square of optimal sales with linear demand. With our mean-






















2. Given this, plugging the optimal export level from (5) with (7) back into the 
objective function, (4), gives the risk-adjusted reward to exporting, i.e.:  






















where we have normalised s
e=1 to reduce clutter in the expressions. Note that this implicitly assumes that 
the exchange rate is iid, (the mean is independent of past realisations).  
3.2.4 
Having worked out the optimal actions and pay-offs for the second and third stages, we turn to the first stage 
market-entry decision, i.e. the decision of whether to export at all.  
Home firms plainly care about profit denominated in Home currency. For this reason, we must translate 
both the operating profit and the fixed entry costs – both of which have hereto been denominated in Foreign 
currency units – into Home currency units when considering the entry decision. To that end, we assume that 
Home firms make the discrete entry decision on the basis of the risk-adjusted return to market entry, namely 
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Long-run equilibrium: free entry  
s
e(U-F)-var(U-F). From (8) we see that the variance of U-F is zero, so the entry criteria is just s
e(U-F). It is 
obvious that this is positive, if and only if (U-F) is positive. In short, the currency of denomination has no 
impact on the entry decision.  
Figure 2: The volume-volatility and volume-trade cost links 
Since the per-firm level of exports falls with a firm’s “m”, and the pay-off function rises with the square of 
export sales, it is plain that there exists a critical value of m that partitions the range of firms into exporters 
and non-exporters. Formally, the cut off is defined in terms of the highest m that would permit firms to 
cover the entry cost. The equation that determines the ‘cut-off m’ is: 





















where mC is cut-off m and Q is given by (7). Firms with m’s less than this will export. Given the complexity 
of Q, however, this expression cannot be solved analytically for mC. There is no difficulty, however, in 
solving it numerically. Having shown how mC is determined, we can plug the solution back into (7) to get 






Note: This left panel is drawn for a=10., b=.1 and tau=1.7; the right panel is drawn for a=10., b=.1 and v=1; sensitivity 
analysis reveals that the negative slopes holds for all parameter values tried.  
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3.3.  Trade impact of exchange rate volatility 
Given the lack of an explicit solution for the volume of trade, Q, we simulate the volatility-volume and τ-
volume links; Figure 2 shows the results. This allows us to write: 
Result 1: 
The volume of trade declines as exchange rate volatility, and as trade-barriers, rise. 
While the impact of volatility on trade is clear, it is useful to decompose effects. The elimination of 
exchange rate uncertainty, i.e. setting σ
2=0, will affect exports in two ways. First, the level of exports per 
active firm will increase. This is seen immediately by inspection of the optimal sales level in (5). Second, 
the number of Foreign firms active in the Home market will increase since it lowers the cut-off mC. In other 
words, lower volatility drops in the minimum class size that engages in exporting. 
Result 2: 
A reduction in exchange rate volatility raises both the sales per exporting firm and raises the number of 
firms exporting. 
3.3.1 Convexity  of  the  volume-volatility  link 
Simulation of our model shows that the relationship between trade and volatility is convex for a wide range 
of parameters, as shown schematically in Figure 1. This leads to: 
Result 3: 
The marginal increase in trade as volatility falls gets progressively larger as volatility approaches zero, i.e. 
the volume-volatility link is convex for a wide range of parameters. 
Sources of nonlinearity in the volume-volatility link 
To provide intuition for the convexity of the link, we illustrate the two sources of nonlinearity discussed 
above. The first is that exchange rate uncertainty systematically affects small firms more than it affects large 
firms. The second stems from the fact that the empirical distribution of firms is skewed heavily towards 
small firms.  




2. The key point is that the impact 
of the volatility is amplified by the marginal cost. Indeed, the impact rises with the square of marginal costs. 
Since small firms tend to have high marginal costs (that is why they are small), volatility systematically 
affects them most. Inspection of (8), for example, shows that a rise in σ reduces the exports of a small firm 
more than it reduces the exports of a large firms.  
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Given this simple point, the argument is direct. Even holding constant the number of firms that are 
exporting, a given reduction in σ raises trade more when there are more small firms exporting. Of course, as 
the initial level of volatility falls, the range of exporting firms expands to include progressively smaller 
firms, so the impact of a marginal drop in σ rises as the initial level of σ falls.  
The second point is even easier. As just mentioned, the minimum size-class of firms that export falls as 
volatility falls. Since the number of firms in each size class rises rapidly as size diminishes, each progressive 
marginal reduction of the minimum size-class brings an ever larger number of new exporters into action. 
4. ESTIMATION 
4.1.  The empirical model 
Our empirical work is based on a gravity model similar to the one used in Rose (2000) and most subsequent 
studies. The basic idea of the gravity is based on Helpman and Krugman (1985). Given CES preferences 
over domestic and imported varieties, the demand for a single imported variety is: 










) (  
where xod(j) is the exports from the ‘origin’ nation to the ‘destination’ nation of variety j, ED is the 
destination nation’s expenditure on imports, and PD is the destination nation’s price index of goods that are 
substitutable with xod;  ε is the elasticity of substitution among all varieties, and, under Dixit-Stiglitz 
monopolistic competition, it is the demand elasticity facing exporters. The total volume of bilateral exports 
is just the number of varieties exported from origin nation ‘o’ to destination nation ‘d’ times the import level 
per variety, that is: 
(11)   O od D
D
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where the second expression shows the assumption that the range of varieties available in nation ‘o’ is 
proportional to the size of ‘o’ endowment of factors, L. Here we have imposed symmetry on all nation-o 
made varieties.  
Furthermore, we assume that the price of a typical variety varies with man-made trade barriers, with a 
distance related cost of trade, and with the unit factor cost in nation o. Thus, imposing: 
(12)   D O
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where δ is the constant elasticity of trade costs with respect to bilateral distance, τ reflects all bilateral, man-
made trade barriers, wo is the origin nation’s factor cost and ao reflects its factor productivity level.  
Assuming either factor price equalisation and a common technology, or different technology and a 
proportionality between factor rewards and factor productivity (i.e. wages are higher in highly productive 
nations in a way such that wiai is fairly constant across nations), we can write the aggregate bilateral exports 
as: 
(13)   D O od od D o o od E L D P a w X
ε εδ ε τ λ
− − − − = ) ( ) ( ) ( ) (
1  
where the constancy of ‘w0 a0’  across partnerships permits us to eliminate the subscripts.  
Taking logs we have: 
(14) εδ β ε β β β − ≡ − ≡ + + + + + = 2 1 2 1 , ); ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( D O od od o d od E L D C C C C X  
where, the last two terms are the standard gravity factors, i.e. product of size variables, and bilateral 
distance. The other terms reflect an exporter specific term ‘Co’, an importer specific term ‘Cd’ – these are 
sometimes called the remoteness factor or multilateral trade resistance – and bilateral trade barriers ‘Cod’ 
that reflect expected risk and includes dummies for some well known bilateral trade barriers such as 
common membership in the EU, and membership in the euro area . Our theoretical section – equations (3) 
through (9) – provides an account of how expected risk is related to the volume of bilateral trade.     
Most estimates of the gravity model use aggregate trade flows as the dependent variable so it is reasonable 
to take aggregate size measures as proxies for L and E. The usual practice is to take the two nations’ real 
GDPs, under the assumption that the importer’s expenditure will be proportional to its GDP and the range of 
products available in the exporting nation will be proportional to its GDP. 
When using sectoral trade data, however, the mapping between L and E and GDPs is less clear. On the 
importer’s side, one can think of using the corresponding sector’s gross value added. However, the import-
demand for, say, chemicals arises from many sectors other than the chemicals sector. On the export side, 
one can think of using sectoral production as a proxy for the number of varieties, but sector production data 
is difficult to get for long time periods and a broad sample of countries. Moreover, such sectoral value added 
measures are typically fraught with many measurement problems.  
We experimented however with the value added per sector, deflated with overall manufacturing producer 
prices (for the reason explained above). For the importer, we took apparent consumption, which is equal to 
the value added of the sector, minus exports plus imports. Second, we used real GDP of the exporter and the 
importer. This has the inconvenient vis-à-vis the value added specification, that the income variable is the 
same across all the sectors, so that the regression does not contain any sector variant variable any more 
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(except for the dependent variable). However, when we do not pool across sectors, the variable coefficient 
on the income variables should help circumvent this problem. The advantage of using the GDP is that we 
have a complete dataset, while for the value added and the apparent consumption we have many missing 
observations. 
The distance, as usual, is measured as the great circle distance between national capitals. Furthermore, we 
define an EU-dummy which is equal to unit when both trading partners are member of the EU, and two 
EMU dummies: one, which is equal to unit if and when both partners are members of EMU (EMU2), and 
one which is equal to unit if and when only one of the two partners is in EMU. 
4.2.  The data 
We focus on two sources of convexity. First, it is often asserted that volatility affects small firms more than 
it affects large ones. Consequently, the marginal impact of lower volatility will be large when the initial set 
of exporting firms includes more small firms (as predicted by the negative level relationship between 
minimum firm size and exporting). Second, the empirical distribution of firms in European nations is 
heavily skewed towards smaller firms. Thus each reduction in the minimum size-class necessary for 
exporting brings forth an ever larger number of new exporters. As the number of small firms, and hence the 
marginal costs are quite different across sectors, we decided to use sectoral data in our empirical analysis. 
In our estimations, we use sectoral, bilateral import data on ISIC Rev.3 2-digit and 3-digit manufacturing 
sectors for the euro area of 12 nations, the 3 non-euro area EU members as well as Australia, Canada, 
Norway, Japan and the US (note that the Belgium-Luxembourg economic union does not report separate 
data for the two nations, and that Ireland is excluded due to some data shortages, so there are only 10 trade 
partners in the euro area of 12 countries). The exact sectors used for the regressions are reported in the 
appendix.  
Trade (import) data are from the OECD Bilateral Trade Database, deflated using manufacturing producer 
prices. Although it would be more appropriate to use the import prices from each individual sector used in 
the regressions, the limited data availability for import or producer prices for our sample and sector 
breakdown obliged us to use overall manufacturing producer prices. 
6  
Bilateral trade flows are significantly affected by income fluctuations and growth in EU nations has varied 
substantially in recent years. This, of course, is why we control for GDP in the regressions, but before 
turning to the formal statistical analysis, it is interesting to eyeball the raw trade flows.  
                                                      
6 Unit value indices are available only for a 2-digits breakdown and only for EU countries. 
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To reduce the data to a manageable dimension we group our raw data into broader SITC classifications: 
Chemicals and related products (sector 5), Manufactured goods classified chiefly by material (sector 6), 
Machinery and transport equipment (sector 7) and Miscellaneous manufactured articles (sector 8).   
Appendix B contains more information on the developments in these sectors. 
Regarding exchange rate volatility, the argument to include this variable into the model is that the expected 
risk might reduce exports, as reflected in the variable Cod in equation (14). In our model, we use two 
different definitions of exchange rate uncertainty: first, it is defined as the annual variance of the weekly 




































where Sij is the nominal exchange rate between currencies i and j, and the subscript w is the week. This 
measure is calculated for each country pairing for which the bilateral trade flows are analysed. We do not 
use a volatility measure based on real exchange rates, as the data would be less homogeneous across 
countries. The results should however not differ much, as inflation rates were rather similar across the 
countries of our sample over our estimation period. 
As it is the expected risk that matters, we experiment with different moving averages of exchange rate 
volatility over the past, arguing that past exchange rate volatility should influence the expectation about 
future exchange rate volatility. 
The second measure for exchange rate uncertainty is based on forward rates. It is defined as the annual 




















abs AFP  
where AFP is the absolute forward premium, and FP is the bilateral forward premium (converted into USD). 
This measure has the advantage that it reflects the expectations on the exchange rate developments between 
the period when the contract for exports is concluded and the period when the exports have to be paid. 
Moreover, it takes into account that the exporter might cover the risk on the foreign exchange market.  
Chart 1 shows the average intra- and extra-euro area exchange rate uncertainty for all euro area countries, 
using both definitions of uncertainty (VOL and AFP). As expected, intra-volatility is lower than extra-
volatility, with a widening of this gap from around 1997 onwards due to the perspective of the creation of 
EMU in 1999. The chart also depicts the 1992-1994 crises in the ERM, with an effect on intra- and on extra-
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euro area exchange rate volatility. An interesting feature is that the absolute forecast premium seems to react 
with some lag to strong exchange rate movements, as for example in the 1992-1994 crisis in the ERM. 
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Source: BIS and own calculations 
ININ (INEX): intra- (extra-)euro area exchange rate uncertainty; VOL is the annual variance of the weekly nominal 
exchange rate return as defined above, multiplied with 100 (to make it comparable with the AFP). AFP is the absolute 
forecast premium.  
 
5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
We estimate the basic model on the pooled data set, and on each sector’s data alone.  
5.1.  The pooled results 
We perform least square estimations of (14) on a pool of non-overlapping sectoral and country data, 
allowing for exporter and importer fixed effects along with industry fixed effects.
7 While in the above 
discussion we presented the model in terms of exports from ‘origin’ to ‘destination’ nation, in the empirical 
tests we use import rather than export data due to data availability and reliability.
8 This should not affect the 
results, as exports from ‘origin’ to ‘destination’ are, from a theoretical point of view, equal to imports of 
‘destination’ from ‘origin’.  
                                                      
7 See the Data Appendix for a list of sectors; in the pooled regressions redundant sectors and ‘not elsewhere classified’ 
(nec) sectors were excluded; the former to avoid using the same data twice and the latter because the ‘nec’ sectors 
include relatively heterogeneous goods. 
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A first set of estimation results is reported in All coefficients of the pooled regression have the expected sign 
and are roughly of the right magnitude. Producer prices are included in the specifications with value added 
and with gross production per sector, following the model of Head and Mayer (2000). The income and size 
variables have the expected positive sign and are statistically significant. The “EU membership” dummy is 
also positive and significant. According to the estimations, members of the EU trade 16-17% more with 
each other than it would be the case if one, or both, trade partners were not members.  
Table 4.  To control for the effect of EMU, we estimate the equation with a dummy, which is equal to one 
when the importer and the exporter are both members of EMU, and zero otherwise. Moreover, we add a 
dummy, which is equal to one if only one of the partners is member of EMU. This dummy measures trade 
diversion or creation effect with respect to third countries. Following Micco et al. (2003) we call the first 
dummy EMU2 and the second dummy EMU1.  
The specifications in All coefficients of the pooled regression have the expected sign and are roughly of the 
right magnitude. Producer prices are included in the specifications with value added and with gross 
production per sector, following the model of Head and Mayer (2000). The income and size variables have 
the expected positive sign and are statistically significant. The “EU membership” dummy is also positive 
and significant. According to the estimations, members of the EU trade 16-17% more with each other than it 
would be the case if one, or both, trade partners were not members.  
Table 4 differ according to the dummy and uncertainty proxy used.
9 
All coefficients of the pooled regression have the expected sign and are roughly of the right magnitude. 
Producer prices are included in the specifications with value added and with gross production per sector, 
following the model of Head and Mayer (2000). The income and size variables have the expected positive 
sign and are statistically significant. The “EU membership” dummy is also positive and significant. 
According to the estimations, members of the EU trade 16-17% more with each other than it would be the 
case if one, or both, trade partners were not members.  
                                                      
9 As the time dimension consists of 10 years only, unit root and co-integration tests are relatively unreliable. Therefore, 
we do not consider an error correction framework for our estimation. 
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Table 4: Pooled regression results 
coef t-stat coef t-stat coef t-stat coef t-stat





EMU1 (Only one  trade partner in EMU) 0.14 3.24
*** 0.17 4.10
***





(Producer Prices)i*(Producer Prices)j 0.31 13.94
*** 0.32 14.49
*** 0.31 14.20 0.33 14.84
***





Volatility (5 years moving average)  -19.66 -13.06
*** -19.36 -12.84
***








Rose Effect of EMU2 106% 70% 112% 76%
     5%-confidence interval 82-132% 50-93% 87-140% 55-100%
Rose Effect of EMU1 15% 19%
     5%-confidence interval 6-25% 10-30%
 Number of observations  34892 34892 34892 34892
 Adj R-squared  0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72
 Root MSE       2.74 2.67 2.67 2.73
EMU trade creation and trade diversion effects (1991-2002) - pooled data
(1) (2) (3) (4)
 
Note: T-statistic in italics. The Rose effect is defined as [exp(EMU dummy coeff.) – 1]; it shows the trade increase, in 
percentage terms, due to monetary union. The 5% interval is calculated in the following way: the standard error of the 
coefficient is multiplied with the critical value at 2.5% (1.96) and subtracted for the lower bound and added for the upper 
bound of the confidence interval. 
 
5.1.1  Exchange rate uncertainty and volatility 
Regarding exchange rate uncertainty, the five year moving average of the variance term (VOL) and the 6-
month absolute forward premium (AFP) seemed to be most appropriate
10. The trade reduction through 
exchange rate uncertainty can be calculated from the above results, by taking the average of the exchange 
rate uncertainty measure over time and over trading partners, and multiplying this measure with the 
estimated coefficient. The resulting trade reduction through exchange rate uncertainty amounts to 28% when 
using VOL as proxy, and to 38% when using AFP. An interesting feature is that the reduction in trade is 
significantly lower for the euro area countries, as they have historically relatively low exchange rate 
uncertainty. This can be calculated using the average of the respective uncertainty measures over euro area 
countries only. According to our estimation results, the intra-euro area trade reduction through exchange 
rate uncertainty amounts to 7% with VOL and 20% with AFP. 
                                                      
10 We run the equations for windows from 1 to 8 years for VOL and for 1, 3 and 6 months for AFP and based our choice 
mainly on the adjusted R-squared. 
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5.1.2  Estimates of the “Rose effect” 
Our estimate of the monetary union’s impact on intra-euro area trade –the so called ‘Rose effect’ - varies 
between 70% and 112% The effect is lower when using AFP as a proxy for exchange rate uncertainty, 
indicating that this variable is a better proxy for uncertainty than VOL. As explained above, the effect of 
AFP on bilateral trade flows is stronger than that of VOL. Taking these two findings together, the overall 
effect of EMU – which can be calculated by adding the above EMU effect from the dummy to the effect 
when setting the exchange rate uncertainty to zero – would vary between 91 and 119%. 
All coefficients of the pooled regression have the expected sign and are roughly of the right magnitude. 
Producer prices are included in the specifications with value added and with gross production per sector, 
following the model of Head and Mayer (2000). The income and size variables have the expected positive 
sign and are statistically significant. The “EU membership” dummy is also positive and significant. 
According to the estimations, members of the EU trade 16-17% more with each other than it would be the 
case if one, or both, trade partners were not members. 
All coefficients of the pooled regression have the expected sign and are roughly of the right magnitude. 
Producer prices are included in the specifications with value added and with gross production per sector, 
following the model of Head and Mayer (2000). The income and size variables have the expected positive 
sign and are statistically significant. The “EU membership” dummy is also positive and significant. 
According to the estimations, members of the EU trade 16-17% more with each other than it would be the 
case if one, or both, trade partners were not members.  
Table 4 also shows the 5%-confidence interval of the EMU-effect, which is calculated in the following way: 
the standard error of the coefficient is multiplied with the critical value at 2.5% (1.96) and subtracted for the 
lower bound and added for the upper bound of the confidence interval. The intervals are very large, showing 
that the point estimates of the EMU effect should be treated with caution. In particular, the difference 
between the lower and the upper bound amounts to roughly 50% in all specifications. This finding is not 
surprising for a dummy variable, and is common to many other studies on the currency union effect on trade 
or ‘Rose’ effect. It shows how carefully the results need to be interpreted.  
5.1.3  Trade with non-Eurozone nations 
Interestingly, the third country dummy (EMU1) seems to indicate that there is no trade diversion, but rather 
some trade creation through EMU between participating and non-participating countries, which ranges 
between 15 and 19%.  
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This result is intriguing. If one could model the trade-reducing effects of volatility as a frictional trade 
barrier, the one-sided dummy should have been negative. The euro would have been akin to a 
discriminatory liberalisation and this should have reduced the exports of non-euro nations to the Euro area. 
A possible explanation of this result is however that the increase in trade flows between euro area countries 
requires more imports as input for the production of the exports. The import intensity of euro area exports 
could indeed lead to a positive impact of lower intra-euro area exchange rate uncertainty on imports from 
non-euro area countries.  
5.1.4  About the volatility-trade link 
Most notable is the fact that the exchange rate uncertainty and the monetary union dummies are jointly 
significant indicating that the effect of exchange rate uncertainty on trade flows might be non-linear. 
Suppose the true relationship between volatility and trade is convex, as illustrated by the solid curve in 
Figure 1 . An empirical model that assumed a linear link between volatility and trade (as illustrated by the 
dashed line), but also allowed a dummy for monetary union (i.e. zero volatility), would estimate the dummy 
to be positive and significant. Importantly, if the link were sufficiently convex, then adding a finite number 
of higher order volatility terms to the regression would not be enough. There would still be room for a 
significant currency dummy.  
Hence according to our empirical results, the linear volatility term predicts a steady rise in the log volume of 
trade; the dummy, which equals one when both nations use the euro, predicts a jump in trade just as 
volatility reaches zero. 
We can however imagine that data can also be characterized by alternative forms of non-linearity that are 
much smoother – forms that resemble the continuous line in figure 4-1, if the non-linearity is convex. The 
precise form of the non-linearity will depend upon functional forms, so we cannot make a robust prediction 
as to the exact form. It is well known, however, that any continuous function, y=f(x), can be well 
approximated by a polynomial in x of a sufficiently high order. Using this result, we test for a smoother 
form of non-linearity in the trade-volatility link by introducing a squared volatility term in addition to the 
linear term.  
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EMU1 (Only one  trade partner in EMU) 0.21
4.80 *** 0.20
4.74 ***















Volatility (5 years moving average)  -61.54
-16.45 *** -63.16
-16.82 ***














Rose Effect of EMU2 76% 19% 83% 22%
     5%-confidence interval 55-100% 3-38% 61-107% 5-42%
Rose Effect of EMU1 23% 22%
     5%-confidence interval 13-34% 13-33%
 Number of observations  34892 34892 34892 34892
 Adj R-squared  0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72
 Root MSE       2.67 2.66 2.67 2.66
Non-linearity of the trade volatility link (1991-2002) - pooled data
(1) (2) (3) (4)
 
Note: The superscript numbers are t-statistics. 
The results, shown in Table 5, provide direct support for the non-linearity hypothesis and some support for 
the smooth-form of the convexity since the linear term is negative and the quadratic term is positive. 
The fact that EMU2 is significant even when the quadratic volatility term is included, suggests a couple of 
possibilities. First, the trade-volatility link may look like a combination of the smooth and discrete forms 
illustrated in Figure 1, i.e. that trade falls according to the curved line right up to zero volatility but then it 
jumps up to point B. Second, it could be that there is no discrete jump at zero volatility but that the true 
relationship is more non-linear than can be captured by a second order approximation. To pursue this line of 
thinking, in table 6 we include a cubic volatility term and higher order terms and we re-estimate the 
equation without EMU dummies (in columns 1 and 3) and with EMU dummies (in columns 2 and 4). 
Results from columns (1) and (3) should provide more detail about the true nature of the detected non 
linearity. Results from columns (2) and (4) will, on the other hand, provide a hint as to our hypothesis that 
the trade-volatility link may look like a combination of the smooth and discrete forms illustrated in Figure 1. 
We report only the cubic and quadratic terms since STATA drops the 5th and above orders automatically. 
The results are mildly encouraging, as Table 6 shows. 
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Table 5 : Detecting non-linearities in the trade-volatility link  
Table 6 : Higher order volatility terms 
EMU2 (Both trade partners in EMU) 0.60
9.35 *** 0.23
2.78 ***
EMU1 (Only one  trade partner in EMU) 0.21
4.81 *** 0.22
5.05 ***















Volatility (5 years moving average)  -69.94
-18.80 *** -63.57
-16.54 ***
Vol^2 (5 years moving average)  59705.15
13.65 *** 54399.25
12.09 ***
Vol^3 (5 years moving average)  -1621043
-0.81 ns -1013877
-0.51 ns


















Rose Effect of EMU2 82% 26%
     5%-confidence interval 61-107% 7-48%
Rose Effect of EMU1 23% 24%
     5%-confidence interval 13-34% 14-35%
 Number of observations  34892 34892 34892 34892
 Adj R-squared  0.7201 0.72 0.72 0.72
 Root MSE       2.6704 2.67 2.66 2.66
Non-linearity of the trade volatility link (1991-2002) - pooled data
(1) (2) (3) (4)
 
Note: The superscript numbers are t-statistics. 
Columns (1) and (2) report results for the specification where exchange rate uncertainty is proxied by the 5-
years moving average volatility term (VOL). As just mentioned, we estimate the same relationship without 
EMU dummy (column 1) and with a EMU dummy (column 2), respectively. Columns (3) and (4) report 
results for the same relationship – without and with EMU dummies – but where exchange rate uncertainty is 
proxied by the AFP term.  
We first concentrate on the results from the AFP specification. When we exclude the EMU2 and EMU1 
terms, as suggested by the smooth form of convexity, all volatility terms are individually significant and of 
the expected sign. The second order term is positive and the third order term negative – we do not have 
priors concerning higher order terms. In the VOL specification, the cubic term has the right sign but it is 
statistically not significant. 
It is interesting and perhaps important that when we include linear, quadric and cubic volatility terms, the 
EMU2 and EMU1 dummies are still significant; see columns (2) and (4). This suggests that there may be a 
pure Monetary Union effect in the sense of a discrete jump in trade when volatility reaches zero. In 
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conclusion, these tests signal the co-existence of a convex relationship between volatility and trade and 
of a discrete jump in presence of a Monetary Union. 
5.2.  Sectoral results 
We estimated the model using a fixed-effect panel estimator (time series data on each bilateral trade flow) 
for each sector separately. Table 7 shows the results for the variable that are of greatest interest to us, 
namely the monetary union dummy and our uncertainty measure.
11 In particular, it shows - for the same four 
specifications as in the pooled regression – the percentage impact of EMU2 and EMU1 on trade, along with 
potential trade creation through the elimination of intra-euro area exchange rate uncertainty. Moreover, we 
show the sum of the EMU2 and the uncertainty effect. We only report those results which have a 
significance level of 10% or more. 
We use all sectors, subsectors and their aggregations provided by the OECD STAN and BTD databases. 
Note that these report a somewhat overlapping classification of data with 2 and 3 digit sectors, depending on 
availability. For example, sector 27 is reported together with sector 28, and separately. Therefore, we mark 
the bigger categories, which encompass several sub-sectors, in bold in the table. Moreover, with the value 
added specification, the number of observations varies substantially between sectors (see Appendix), as 
sectoral value added data are not available for the complete sample. 
The results indicate that while exchange rate uncertainty appears to be consistently negative and significant 
across sectors, the average effect of EMU2 is now somewhat lower than in the estimations where we pooled 
across sectors as well, with an average between 21 and 108% when taking the average only over those 
sectors, where the EMU2 dummy is significant. 
Similar to the pooled regressions, results for the specifications with the volatility term (VOL) tend to report 
a higher EMU2 dummy coefficient than the ones with the absolute forecast premium (AFP). By 
construction, the EMU2 dummy reflects both the impact of the mere creation of EMU and residual effects 
linked to the elimination of exchange rate uncertainty and not otherwise depicted. Our finding might   
 
                                                      
11 Tables with the full results for all variables can be found in the Appendix. 
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pledge in favour of the AFP as a more appropriate proxy for exchange rate uncertainty than the VOL 
specification. 
It is insightful to look at the joint effect of the elimination of exchange rate uncertainty (measured using 
the AFP or VOL data) and the ‘Rose’ effect (i.e. the effect of the mere creation of a currency union). The 
sum of the coefficients for the two effects indicates figures for trade creation ranging from 40% to 87%.
12 
Furthermore, the combined effect doesn’t show swings as large as the ones reported earlier for the 
individual EMU dummy effect. It shows, on the contrary, little sensitiveness to the chosen specification of 
exchange rate uncertainty and volatility – trade creation amounts to 61-87% when using the VOL 
specifications, and to 40-82% for the AFP specifications. Ordering the sectors according to the size of the 
coefficients for VOL and AFP shows that – although similar when using the same uncertainty measure – 
the ranking differs between VOL and AFP specifications. 
The impact of EMU seems to differ substantially across sectors, with relatively strong effects for the 
following sectors “Electricity, gas and water supply”, “Building and repairing ships and boats”, “Office, 
accounting and computing machinery”, “Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers”, “Non-pharmaceutical 
chemicals”, and “Chemical, rubber, plastics and fuel products”. It should be noted that the first sector was 
subject to a huge number of privatisations over the last years in the EU, so that the EMU dummy could 
catch up some of this effect as well. At the same time, we find no significant EMU effect for protected 
manufactures and commodities, as “Aircraft and spacecraft”, “Coke, refined petroleum products and 
nuclear fuel”, “Iron and steel”, “Mining and quarrying”, “Railroad equipment transport equipment” and 
“Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing”. 
Our findings suggest that the theoretical model proposed in section 3 explains better those sectors 
characterised by imperfect competition features and increasing returns to scale. It should be noted that, 
similarly to the pooled regression, the size variable seems to have an impact on the size and significance of 
the EMU dummies. In particular, the effect appears stronger when using the value added rather than the 
GDP specification, and it is mostly not significant for the specification with GDP and volatility. As 
expected, the ordering of the sectors according to the size of the EMU effect is similar between the two 
GDP specification on the one hand, and between the two value added specifications on the other hand, 
while differences emerge between the GDP and the value added specification. 
                                                      
12 It should be noted that this average includes all sectors, rather than only those where the EMU2 dummy is 
significant, as above. Therefore, it is not fully comparable with the average over the EMU2 dummy effect. 
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Finally, the third country dummy points to trade creation of 10-17% between non-euro area and euro area 
countries, but is mostly not significant when using the GDP specification. The ordering of the sectors 
according to the size of the third country effect is similar in both value-added specifications. 
As for the pooled regression, we also calculated a 5%-confidence interval in order to check the results 
obtained above (see Table 8). 
The results show that the 5%-confidence interval is very large for most sectors, varying for example for 
the sector ‘Machinery and equipment’ between 11 and 143%. The size of the interval differs across 
sectors, but the results confirm those of the pooled regression, in that point estimates for the EMU effect 
need to be taken with caution. 
Table 8: Sectoral results with 5%-confidence intervals 
   Specification with VOL  Specification with AFP 
    Specif. with VA  Specif. with GDP Specif. with VA  Specif. with GDP
    EMU2 EMU1 EMU2 EMU1 EMU2 EMU1 EMU2 EMU1 
01-05  Agric., hunting, forestry and fishing     -2-111       
10-14 Mining  and  quarrying        10-10    
15-16  Food products, beverages and tobacco  9-131   20-134  -4-104  11-11  -4-89  
17-19  Textiles, textile products, leather and
footwear 
 -43--4  5-112    -39-3    
20  Wood and products of wood and cork  39-230 15-103 1-109    9-157  30-126     
21-22  Pulp, paper&products, printing& publ.  17-148  15-128   3-117       
23-25  Chemical, rubber, plastics&fuel prod.  25-156 -3-55 3-110    6-115  0-59     
23  Coke, refined petroleum prod.&nucl.fuel        0-124    24-26    -4-114 
24  Chemicals and chemical products  32-183  22-101  -1-100    11-138  25-105     
2423 Pharmaceuticals  17-193  45-193   -2-72  -3-145  46-193  -2-71 
24ex2423 Chemicals  excluding  pharmaceuticals  11-173  0-84  4-107      6-94     
25  Rubber and plastics products    -42--7  13-122     -41--6     
26 Other  non-metallic mineral products   -36-2  -5-88          
27-28  Basic metals & fabricated metal prod.     -3-96       
27 Basic  metals  32-211       -1-135       
271+2731  Iron  and  steel          
272+2732 Non-ferrous  metals  46-303        -3-168       
28  Fabricated  metal  products     2-98       
29-33 Machinery  and  equipment  11-143  2-70  1-108  -5-108  6-76     
29  Machinery and equipment, n.e.c.  50-226  15-90  -4-91    24-170  19-97     
30-33  Electrical and optical equipment  1-109    3-108           
30  Office, accounting&computing machinery  86-306  6-89  6-119    43-214  13-99     
31  Electrical machinery and apparatus, nec    -40-1      -51-3       
32  Radio, television and communication   36-196  13-109      8-136  14-109     
33  Medical, precision and optical instruments -5-128  -5-83  -5-83      0-92     
34-35 Transport  equipment  107-357 21-111 2-113    72-281 33-129     
34  Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers  57-296 21-117 5-121    35-242 29-130     
35 Other  transport  equipment  50-312 6-105 -6-106    33-265  24-140     
351  Building and repairing of ships and boats  21-631    40-384   12-585    6-272   
352+359  Railroad  equip.&transport  equip.  n.e.c.         
353  Aircraft  and  spacecraft          
36-37 Manufacturing  nec;  recycling  18-156 5-70 7-110    8-133 14-85     
40-41  Electricity, gas and water supply   -93--66  217-
1744 
-77--19  -93--64  165-1498 -81--33
Note: The 5% interval is calculated in the following way: the standard error of the coefficient is multiplied with the 
critical value at 2.5% (1.96) and subtracted from (for the lower bound of the confidence interval), and added to (for the 
upper bound of the confidence interval) the coefficient estimate. 
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6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This paper contributes to the rapidly growing literature on the impact of Europe’s monetary union on 
trade, with two elements.  
It proposes a theoretical model explaining why the mere creation of a monetary union can have a positive 
effect on trade even when a linear exchange rate volatility term is taken into account. It also contributes to 
the empirical literature on the impact of Europe’s monetary union on trade, by proposing, for the first 
time, an analysis of sectoral data. Our theoretical model shows that in a monopolistic competition set-up, 
the effect of exchange rate uncertainty on trade has non linear features, indicating that EMU should have 
an effect on top to the one observed when setting exchange rate volatility equal to zero. The marginal 
increase in trade as volatility falls gets progressively larger as volatility approaches zero. In other words, 
we find evidence supporting the hypothesis of a convex trade-volatility link. To provide intuition for the 
non-linearity of the link, we illustrate two sources of convexity. First, exchange rate systematically affects 
small firms more that large firms. Second, the empirical distribution of firms is skewed heavily towards 
small firms. Hence our model leads to the conclusion that a reduction in exchange rate volatility raises the 
sales per exporting firm and the number of exporting firms. This finding is crucial and at the same time 
new in the literature, as it suggests that the trade-exchange rate uncertainty relationship can be proxied by 
a linear volatility term along with a currency union dummy. In our empirical part we test the theoretical 
findings on a sectorally disaggregated dataset. As customary in the relevant literature, we empirically test 
a gravity-like model of trade. We use a range of different specifications allowing us to test the results for 
their sensitivity to the chosen specification for exchange rate uncertainty, for the size variable of the 
gravity equation and for different sectors. A first set of estimations pools data across countries and sectors, 
while in a second instance data are pooled only across countries, allowing thereby for sectoral differences. 
We introduce both an exchange rate uncertainty term (proxied by two alternative measures: the variance of 
the nominal exchange rate return, VOL, and the absolute forecast premium, AFP) and an EMU dummy 
into our model. The results for both specifications lead us to conclude that the effect of exchange rate 
uncertainty is negative, significant and robust to changes in the specification. Furthermore, our overall 
finding of joint significance of exchange rate uncertainty and the EMU dummy is in line with the intuition 
from the theory that points to non-linearities in the relationship between trade and exchange rate 
uncertainty. 
The results indicate that the mere creation of EMU would increase trade by 70-112% according to the 
regression pooled both by country and industry, and by 21-108% when allowing for sector specific 
coefficients (taking into account only significant estimates). The EMU effect is smaller when using AFP 
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as proxy for exchange rate uncertainty. We believe that this might indicate that the AFP is a better proxy 
for exchange rate uncertainty. In this context, the bigger figures for the EMU dummy can be read as 
reflecting some of the uncertainty impact that the VOL proxy is unable to depict. Adding the effect of the 
elimination of exchange rate uncertainty to the so-called ‘Rose’ effect of the mere creation of a currency 
union, the results indicate a trade creation between 91 and 119% according to the pooled regression, and 
40 to 87% according to the sectoral regression (taking this time account of all sectors, i.e. not excluding 
those for which the EMU dummy was not significant). We also found further evidence for the convex 
form of the trade-exchange rate uncertainty relationship when introducing higher order uncertainty terms 
into the pooled regression. 
It should be noted that the size of the EMU effect is also sensitive to the choice of the size variable (GDP 
or value added by sector). Measurement problems and the limited availability of sectoral value added data 
are possible sources of the observed discrepancies. Differences in results might derive from the fact that 
when dealing with sectoral data, the mapping between empirical and theoretical measures for the size 
variables of the gravity equation (endowment of factors and expenditures) is problematic. Both aggregate 
GDP and sectoral value added are imperfect approximations of real import demand and export supply, 
which take into account cross sector elasticities. Hence, given the difficulties of precisely assessing the 
trade creation brought about by the EMU, we suggest considering the figures provided by our estimations 
as possible ranges of the Rose effect.  
We also test whether EMU has a significant impact on trade flows with non-EMU countries. In line with 
other authors, we find a significant and positive impact in most specifications, indicating that third 
countries tend to trade up to 27% more with EMU countries since the creation of EMU. This effect is also 
stronger for those sectors characterised by increasing returns to scale and imperfect competition features. 
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Appendix A  Data  
Imports: OECD Bilateral Sectoral Trade Database. The sectors (ISIC Rev. 3) are ISIC rev 3 sectors 
Industry
01-05 AGRICULTURE, HUNTING, FORESTRY AND FISHING
10-14 MINING AND QUARRYING
15-16 FOOD PRODUCTS, BEVERAGES AND TOBACCO
15-37 TOTAL MANUFACTURING
17-19 TEXTILES, TEXTILE PRODUCTS, LEATHER AND FOOTWEAR
20 WOOD AND PRODUCTS OF WOOD AND CORK
21-22 PULP, PAPER, PAPER PRODUCTS, PRINTING AND PUBLISHING
23 ….COKE, REFINED PETROLEUM PRODUCTS AND NUCLEAR FUEL
23-25 CHEMICAL, RUBBER, PLASTICS AND FUEL PRODUCTS
24 ….CHEMICALS AND CHEMICAL PRODUCTS
2423 ……PHARMACEUTICALS
24ex2423 ……CHEMICALS EXCLUDING PHARMACEUTICALS
25 ….RUBBER AND PLASTICS PRODUCTS
26 OTHER NON-METALLIC MINERAL PRODUCTS
27 ….BASIC METALS
27-28 BASIC METALS AND FABRICATED METAL PRODUCTS
271+2731 ……IRON AND STEEL
272+2732 ……NON-FERROUS METALS
28 ….FABRICATED METAL PRODUCTS
29 ….MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT, N.E.C.
29-33 MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT
30 ……OFFICE, ACCOUNTING AND COMPUTING MACHINERY
30-33 ….ELECTRICAL AND OPTICAL EQUIPMENT
31 ……ELECTRICAL MACHINERY AND APPARATUS, NEC
32 ……RADIO, TELEVISION AND COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT
33 ……MEDICAL, PRECISION AND OPTICAL INSTRUMENTS
34 ….MOTOR VEHICLES, TRAILERS AND SEMI-TRAILERS
34-35 TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT
35 ….OTHER TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT
351 ……BUILDING AND REPAIRING OF SHIPS AND BOATS
352+359 ……RAILROAD EQUIPMENT AND TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT N.E.C.
353 ……AIRCRAFT AND SPACECRAFT
36-37 MANUFACTURING NEC; RECYCLING
40-41 ELECTRICITY, GAS AND WATER SUPPLY
GRAND TOTAL  
Imports are deflated using overall manufacturing producer prices. 
Exchange rates: Bank of Internationl Settlements (BIS). 
GDP: Real GDP, OECD Main Economic Indicators. 
Value added per sector and gross production: OECD Structural Statistics for Industry and Services (see 
www.oecd.org/std/industry-services for more information), deflated with manufacturing producer prices. 
PPI: from OECD Main Economic Indicators, originally in national currency, converted into USD using 
OECD exchange rates. Note that for the euro area countries, the original data were back-converted into an 
artificial euro, so that we converted them into USD using the euro for the whole period (also pre-EMU) 
(see newsletter OECD, Nb 4 page 6). 
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Appendix B  Composition of bilateral trade flows 
In , we calculate the percentage of each of these sectors in total manufacturing trade for intra-euro area 
exports (intra-intra), exports from intra- to extra-euro area countries (intra-extra), exports from extra- to 
intra-euro area countries (extra-intra) and trade between extra-euro area countries (extra-extra). For all 
four groupings according to the direction of the trade flows, sector 7 (machinery and transport equipment) 
represents the largest share with about 50 or more percent. Intra-euro area countries export more of sector 
6 goods (manufactured goods classified chiefly by material) to both destinations than extra-euro area 
countries.  
Table 9: Relative importance of trade sectors 
Percentage of the main sectors in total exports 
 Intra-intra  Intra-extra  Extra-intr
a 
Extra-extra 
5 - Chemicals and related products  15.7  15.2  10.6  16.4 
6 - Manufactured goods classified chiefly by material  22.9  20.9  15.4  14.6 
7 - Machinery and transport equipment  47.6  47.7  61.6  52.6 
8 - Miscellaneous manufactured articles  13.7  16.3  12.4  16.4 
 
The shares differ however quite a lot between the individual countries. In particular, Greece is an 
exception to the relatively big size of sector 7 (machinery and transport equipment) (only 7% of the total), 
while the sector represents almost 80% of Japan’s total manufacturing exports, a share which is 
significantly higher than in the euro area. The share of sector 8 (Miscellaneous manufactured articles) is 
particularly high for Italy, Portugal, Denmark and Greece while it is very small for Finland, Norway, 
Japan and Canada. This is mainly related to the sectors ‘clothing’ and ‘footwear’, and partly also to the 
sector ‘furniture’. Exports in sectors 5 (Chemicals and related products) and 6 (Manufactured goods 
classified chiefly by material) differ substantially between the different countries, with the biggest share in 
Ireland (35%) and the smallest share in Portugal and Japan (5%) for sector 5, and with the biggest share in 
Finland and Norway (48 and 47% respectively) and the smallest share in Ireland (5%) for sector 6. 
Table 9 shows the development over time of intra- and extra-euro area exports in the four above-
mentioned sectors. From this graph we can see that the euro area’s exports to non euro area nations have 
grown faster than intra-group trade over the past decade (the gap is negative). Moreover, there does seem 
to have been a large change between 2000 and 2001, with this movement especially remarkable in the 
largest sector – machinery and transport equipment. This means that since 2001, intra-euro area trade has 
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been growing more in this sector than extra-euro area trade. The other sectors show a similar up tick, but it 
is noticeably more muted, especially for the miscellaneous category.  
Chart 2  Euro area’s intra- and extra-euro area nominal trade by sector 





















Chemicals etc Manuf by material
Machinery & Transport eq Misc Manuf
 
Regarding individual countries, Finland, France, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain have faster intra- than 
extra-euro area trade growth, while for the other countries there is no convincing evidence for stronger 
intra- than extra-euro area trade growth. In particular for Austria and Belgium, extra-euro area trade 
increased substantially more than intra-trade in most sectors. While for Austria, this might be explained by 
the relatively high share of trade to Eastern European countries, it is more surprising for Belgium. For 
Austria, the stronger increase in extra-trade comes mainly from organic and inorganic chemicals as well as 
from pharmaceutical products, together with power generating machinery and equipment, office machines, 
telecommunications and road vehicles. For the two latter sectors, intra-euro area trade also grew less 
rapidly than extra trade in Belgium. For Belgium, extra-trade increased stronger than intra-trade mainly 
from around 1995 onwards for sectors 7 and 8 (mainly for telecommunications and road vehicles, and for 
sanitary, plumbing and lighting fixtures, furniture, clothing and footwear). Summarising the analysis 
above, it appears that there are substantial differences in trade exposure across the countries examined 
here, which can be relevant for their reaction to exchange rate risk and to the effect of currency union on 
their trade. In particular, sectors in which domestic production of the euro area and international trade are 
substitutable are obviously reacting stronger to exchange rate changes than those where the country is 
largely depending on imports from outside the euro area.  
46
ECB

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Working Paper Series No. 446
February 200551
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 446
February 2005
European Central Bank working paper series
For a complete list of Working Papers published by the ECB, please visit the ECB’s website
(http://www.ecb.int)
402 “Forecasting euro area inflation using dynamic factor measures of underlying inflation”
by G. Camba-Méndez and G. Kapetanios, November 2004.
403 “Financial market integration and loan competition: when is entry deregulation socially beneficial?”
by L. Kaas, November 2004.
404 “An analysis of systemic risk in alternative securities settlement architectures” by G. Iori,
November 2004.
405 “A joint econometric model of macroeconomic and term structure dynamics” by P. Hördahl,
O. Tristani and D. Vestin, November 2004.
406 “Labour market reform and the sustainability of exchange rate pegs” by O. Castrén, T. Takalo and
G. Wood, November 2004.
407 “Banking consolidation and small business lending” by E. Takáts, November 2004.
408 “The great inflation, limited asset markets participation and aggregate demand: FED policy was better
than you think” by F. O. Bilbiie, November 2004.
409 “Currency mismatch, uncertainty and debt maturity structure” by M. Bussière, M. Fratzscher
and W. Koeniger, November 2004.
410 “Do options-implied RND functions on G3 currencies move around the times of interventions
on the JPY/USD exchange rate? by O. Castrén, November 2004.
411 “Fiscal discipline and the cost of public debt service: some estimates for OECD countries”
by S. Ardagna, F. Caselli and T. Lane, November 2004.
412 “The real effects of money growth in dynamic general equilibrium” by L. Graham and
D. J. Snower, November 2004.
413 “An empirical analysis of price setting behaviour in the Netherlands in the period
1998-2003 using micro data” by N. Jonker, C. Folkertsma and H. Blijenberg, November 2004.
414 “Inflation persistence in the European Union, the euro area, and the United States”
by G. Gadzinski and F. Orlandi, November 2004.
415 “How persistent is disaggregate inflation? An analysis across EU15 countries and
HICP sub-indices” by P. Lünnemann and T. Y. Mathä, November 2004.
416 “Price setting behaviour in Spain: stylised facts using consumer price micro data”
by L. J. Álvarez and I. Hernando, November 2004.
417 “Staggered price contracts and inflation persistence: some general results”
by K. Whelan, November 2004.
418 “Identifying the influences of nominal and real rigidities in aggregate price-setting behavior”
by G. Coenen and A. T. Levin, November 2004.
419 “The design of fiscal rules and forms of governance in European Union countries”
by M. Hallerberg, R. Strauch and J. von Hagen, December 2004.52
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 446
February 2005
420 “On prosperity and posterity: the need for fiscal discipline in a monetary union” by C. Detken, V. Gaspar
and B. Winkler, December 2004.
421 “EU fiscal rules: issues and lessons from political economy” by L. Schuknecht, December 2004.
422 “What determines fiscal balances? An empirical investigation in determinants of changes in OECD
budget balances” by M. Tujula and G. Wolswijk, December 2004.
423 “Price setting in France: new evidence from survey data” by C. Loupias and R. Ricart,
December 2004.
424 “An empirical study of liquidity and information effects of order flow on exchange rates”
by F. Breedon and P. Vitale, December 2004.
425 “Geographic versus industry diversification: constraints matter” by P. Ehling and S. B. Ramos,
January 2005.
426 “Security fungibility and the cost of capital: evidence from global bonds” by D. P. Miller
and J. J. Puthenpurackal, January 2005.
427 “Interlinking securities settlement systems: a strategic commitment?” by K. Kauko, January 2005.
428 “Who benefits from IPO underpricing? Evidence form hybrid bookbuilding offerings”
by V. Pons-Sanz, January 2005.
429 “Cross-border diversification in bank asset portfolios” by C. M. Buch, J. C. Driscoll
and C. Ostergaard, January 2005.
430 “Public policy and the creation of active venture capital markets” by M. Da Rin,
G. Nicodano and A. Sembenelli, January 2005.
431 “Regulation of multinational banks: a theoretical inquiry” by G. Calzolari and G. Loranth, January 2005.
432 “Trading european sovereign bonds: the microstructure of the MTS trading platforms”
by Y. C. Cheung, F. de Jong and B. Rindi, January 2005.
433 “Implementing the stability and growth pact: enforcement and procedural flexibility”
by R. M. W. J. Beetsma and X. Debrun,  January 2005.
434 “Interest rates and output in the long-run” by Y. Aksoy and M. A. León-Ledesma,  January 2005.
435 “Reforming public expenditure in industrialised countries: are there trade-offs?”
by L. Schuknecht and V. Tanzi,  February 2005.
436 “Measuring market and inflation risk premia in France and in Germany”
by L. Cappiello and S. Guéné,  February 2005.
437 “What drives international bank flows? Politics, institutions and other determinants”
by E. Papaioannou,  February 2005.
438 “Quality of public finances and growth” by A. Afonso, W. Ebert, L. Schuknecht and M. Thöne,
February 2005.
439 “A look at intraday frictions in the euro area overnight deposit market”
by V. Brousseau and A. Manzanares, February 2005.
440 “Estimating and analysing currency options implied risk-neutral density functions for the largest
new EU member states” by O. Castrén, February 2005.
441 “The Phillips curve and long-term unemployment” by R. Llaudes, February 2005.53
ECB










and A. al-Nowaihi, February 2005.
“Explaining cross-border large-value payment flows: evidence from TARGET and EURO1 data”
“Keeping up with the Joneses, reference dependence, and equilibrium indeterminacy” by L. Stracca
“Welfare implications of joining a common currency” by M. Ca’ Zorzi, R. A. De Santis and F. Zampolli,
“Trade effects of the euro: evidence from sectoral data” by R. Baldwin, F. Skudelny and D. Taglioni,
“Why do financial systems differ? History matters” by C. Monnet and E. Quintin, February 2005.